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The device-independent approach to quantum key distribution (QKD) aims to establish a secret
key between two or more parties with untrusted devices, potentially under full control of a quantum
adversary. The performance of a QKD protocol can be quantified by the secret key rate, which
can be lower bounded via the violation of an appropriate Bell inequality in a setup with untrusted
devices. We study secret key rates in the device-independent scenario for different quantum repeater
setups and compare them to their device-dependent analogon. The quantum repeater setups under
consideration are the original protocol by Briegel et al. and the hybrid quantum repeater protocol by
van Loock et al.. For a given repeater scheme and a given QKD protocol, the secret key rate depends
on a variety of parameters, such as the gate quality or the detector efficiency. We systematically
analyze the impact of these parameters and suggest optimized strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography — the science of (secure) pri-
vate communication based on fundamental properties of
quantum particles — is a very active field of research and
was founded in the early 1980s [1]. An unconditionally
secure encryption technique, the one-time pad [2], relies
on a preshared key between the parties who wish to com-
municate. Secure communication can thus be achieved
by securely distributing this key, which is the ultimate
task of quantum key distribution (QKD). The famous
BB84 protocol [3] was the first proposal for achieving se-
cure QKD. Since then, a variety of other QKD protocols
have been published [4–6]. However, the security of these
device-dependent (DD) protocols relies on a perfect char-
acterization of the measurement devices and the source,
which is impossible in practice. Any realistic implemen-
tation is imperfect, which makes these QKD protocols
vulnerable to an adversary [7–10]. Ideally, one wants to
drop any assumption about any device involved in the
QKD scheme, which is referred to as device-independent
(DI) QKD [11, 12].
As photons possess a long coherence time, one can
transmit these particles through fibers or free space,
thus allowing long-distance QKD. Due to photon losses,
though, which exponentially scale with the distance one
wants to overcome, QKD is limited to distances of L .
150 km [13, 14]. This problem can be circumvented with
quantum repeaters [15].
In this work, we aim at comparing achievable secret key
rates in the DD and DI scenario for different quantum
repeaters without implemented error correction. In par-
ticular, we provide a systematic analysis on how experi-
mental quantities and errors manifest themselves in the
corresponding secret key rates. The DD case has been
analyzed in [16]. Here, we shed light on the fundamental
differences between both scenarios, especially the require-
ments needed for a reasonably high DI secret key rate.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sec. II we
review a generic quantum repeater model [15], recapit-
ulate the fundamentals of QKD, and explain the pecu-
liarities in the device-independent case. Important ingre-
dients, such as the secret key rate R and the errors we
account for, are described. In Sec. III we apply the given
framework to the original quantum repeater proposal by
Briegel et al. [15]. Section IV focuses on the key analysis
for the hybrid quantum repeater [17].
II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
The main source of errors in quantum communication
with photons are losses in the optical fiber, which scale
exponentially with the length L0, such that the transmit-
tivity ηt is given by
ηt(L0) = 10
−αL010 , (1)
where α denotes the attenuation coefficient. In this work
we use α = 0.17 dB/km, which is the attenuation co-
efficient at wavelengths around 1550 nm. To overcome
the exponential photon loss, quantum repeaters for long-
distance quantum information transmission have been
suggested.
In this section we review a generic model for a quan-
tum repeater, originally introduced by Briegel et al. [15].
Furthermore, we briefly discuss other sources of errors
in QKD and how we model and incorporate them in the
quantum repeater scheme. See [16] for a detailed discus-
sion of imperfections. We also review the main ideas of
DIQKD, in particular the DI protocol that we use [11].
A. Generic quantum repeater model
The purpose of a quantum repeater is to generate and
distribute entangled states over a large distance L that
separates two parties, typically called Alice and Bob.
In order to increase the distance over which the states
are entangled, one performs entanglement swapping (ES)
2at intermediate repeater stations equally separated by a
fundamental length L0. In the nested quantum repeater
proposal (see Fig. 1 for a schematic representation), ES
FIG. 1. A generic quantum repeater setup, proposed by [15].
Let k denote the number of distillation rounds performed prior
to the first ES and N the maximum nesting level. Alice and
Bob are separated by the distance L = 2NL0 and share at the
end of the nested protocol the entangled state ρ.
is performed in N consecutive nesting levels, where 2N
segments of fundamental length L0 amount to the total
distance L = 2NL0, which corresponds to 2
N − 1 inter-
mediate repeater stations. For the sake of simplicity, we
only allow state purification via entanglement distillation
(ED) before the first ES is done. The repeater stations
are equipped with quantum memories and processors to
perform the mentioned quantum operations. For ED, we
employ the Deutsch et al. [18] protocol, which generates
after k rounds of distillation a final state of high purity
out of 2k copies of an initial state ρ0. The ES protocol
involves Bell measurements, which can be implemented
in various ways in the experiment [19, 20]. We review
the ED and ES protocol in Appendix B.
As entanglement can be used as a resource for many
quantum informational tasks [21, 22], it is important to
quantify the number of entangled states that can be dis-
tributed between Alice and Bob per second by a quantum
repeater. This quantity is described by the repeater rate
Rrep, which clearly depends on errors that occur in the
quantum repeater. We briefly discuss which errors are
taken into account and how we model them. Afterwards
we discuss the time restrictions that we focus on and ex-
plicitly give the expression for the repeater rate.
1. Errors of the quantum repeater
The elements of a quantum repeater and their errors
are as follows: (i) Quantum channel – Photon losses in
the fiber are described via the transmittivity ηt, Eq. (1).
(ii) Source – We assume that the source creates on de-
mand a state ρ0 and distributes it to adjacent repeater
stations. The quality of these states is described via the
fidelity F0, with respect to a certain Bell state, defined in
Eqs. (14a) and (14b). (iii) Detectors – We assume photon
number resolving detectors (PNRDs) with efficiency ηd,
where dark counts of the detectors are neglected. This
is a reasonable approximation for realistic dark counts of
the order of 10−5 or below, see [16]. (iv) Gates – ED and
ES rely on controlled two-qubit operations, implemented
by a gate with quality pG. This imperfect gate intro-
duces noise, thus mixing the ideal pure entangled state.
We further assume that one-qubit gates work perfectly.
The errors in (i)–(iv) give rise to a success probability
for ED in round k and for ES in nesting level n. We de-
note those probabilities with P
(k)
ED and P
(n)
ES , respectively.
Finally, let P0 denote the probability that a source suc-
cessfully links two adjacent repeater stations in the 0th
nesting level with an initial entangled state ρ0.
2. Repeater rate
For a given set of parameters and within a model that
respects the errors we introduced in the previous sec-
tion, one can achieve a certain repeater rate Rrep. In or-
der to characterize this repeater rate, we need to clarify
which time restrictions we account for. The only time-
consuming operation that we consider is the time needed
to distribute an entangled photon pair among adjacent
repeater stations and acknowledge their successful trans-
mission. This so-called fundamental time T0 depends on
the speed of light c = 2×108 m/s in the fiber, the funda-
mental length L0 separating two repeater stations, and
the location of the photon source. We consider the case
where the source is located at one repeater station, which
yields the fundamental time T0 = 2L0/c [16]. Further-
more, we investigate repeaters with deterministic and
probabilistic ES, i.e., P
(n)
ES = 1 and P
(n)
ES < 1, respec-
tively.
a. Deterministic ES. For perfect detectors ηd = 1,
the ES can be performed in a deterministic manner. The
corresponding repeater rate is given by [23]
Rdetrep =
1
T0
1
Zn
(
P
(k)
L0
) , (2)
where the recursive probability P
(k)
L0
in distillation round
k is defined via
P
(k)
L0
:=
P
(k)
ED
Z1
(
P
(k−1)
L0
) ∀ k ≥ 1 (3)
and P
(0)
L0
:= P0. Here, Zn(p) denotes the average number
of attempts to successfully establish 2n entangled pairs
(each generated with probability p) and it is given by [23]
Zn(p) :=
2n∑
j=1
(
2n
j
)
(−1)j+1
1− (1 − p)j . (4)
The 2n generated pairs are then deterministically con-
verted via ES in the repeater stations to an entangled
pair between Alice and Bob.
3b. Probabilistic ES. ES is a probabilistic procedure
for imperfect detectors. Given P0 ≪ 1, the repeater rate
of a quantum repeater with k rounds of ED and ES in n
nesting levels can be approximated by
Rprobrep =
1
T0
(
2
3
)n+k
P0
k∏
j=1
P
(j)
ED
a
(j−1)
ED
n∏
i=1
P
(i)
ES
a
(i−1)
ES
, (5)
which is a generalized and slightly modified version of
the repeater rates given in [16, 24].1 Here, a
(j)
ED and a
(i)
ES
denote constants that one has to choose depending on
success probabilities to create an entangled state in the
corresponding ED round and nesting level, respectively.
They fulfill 0 < a
(j)
ED, a
(i)
ES ≤ 1 and are typically close to 1.
The repeater rate in Eq. (5) underestimates the actual
repeater rate, as already pointed out in [23]. Recently, a
more sophisticated approach to quantify the repeater rate
with probabilistic ES appeared in the literature [25].2
To our knowledge, an analytical study of the optimal
strategy has not been performed yet.3
B. Quantum key distribution
With the repeater rates in Eqs. (2) and (5), we now
study the possibility to use the entangled states as a re-
source to generate a secret key.
1. Device-dependent QKD
Suppose that Alice and Bob share a classical, authen-
ticated channel and a possibly entangled state ρ, trans-
mitted through a quantum channel. A typical QKD
1 In [24], the repeater rate for probabilistic ES is derived without
initial ED and without the constants a
(i)
ES
. In [16] initial ED is
included and a common constant aED is introduced for every
ED round, which results in a larger repeater rate. In general, it
is not justified to use a common constant aED, as they quickly
approach unity for an increasing number of ED steps. As we
show in Appendix A, one can tackle this problem in a more
efficient way and one can similarly introduce constants for the
ES procedure.
2 Note, however, that for more than n = 2 nesting levels, the re-
peater rate of [25] rapidly becomes only numerically feasible and
provides no further insight into our analysis. Also, since we want
to keep n in principle arbitrary, we settle for the approximated
repeater rate in Eq. (5).
3 In practice, the optimal strategy for maximizing the repeater
rate is to immediately perform ES as soon as entangled pairs are
available in two neighboring repeater links and then proceed by
already distributing new states among these available repeater
stations. Monte Carlo simulations suggest that this approach
can significantly exceed the analytical repeater rates in Eqs. (2)
and (5), depending on n.
setup is shown in Fig. 2. In each measurement round,
FIG. 2. A typical QKD setup. Alice and Bob share a classical
and a quantum channel. A source provides possibly entangled
states ρ that can be measured by the perfectly characterized
measurement devices. A dichotomic classical output is gener-
ated in each measurement round.
Alice and Bob can choose from a set of measurement
settings {A0, A1, . . . } and {B0, B1, . . . }. The setting de-
termines which measurement is performed on their sub-
system. Throughout this work we consider dichotomic
measurement outcomes ai, bj ∈ {±1}.
The performance of a QKD protocol is quantified by the
secret key rate [16]
R := Rrawr∞ = RrepRsiftPclickr∞, (6)
which is our figure of merit. The quantities introduced
in Eq. (6) are the raw key rate Rraw, the fraction Rsift
of measurements performed in the same basis by Alice
and Bob, the probability Pclick for a valid measurement
result, and the secret fraction r∞ (see below).
After generating an arbitrarily long bit string, the clas-
sical postprocessing of the measurement data begins, in-
cluding sifting, which corresponds to discarding measure-
ments where the settings of Alice and Bob did not match.
Note that we fix Rsift = 1, which can be approximately
achieved by choosing the measurement settings with bi-
ased probabilities [26]. The sifted or raw key leads to
the raw key rate Rraw, which is the number of raw bits
Alice and Bob generate per second. These bits are only
partially secure, which is described by the secret fraction
r∞. The explicit form of r∞ depends on the protocol one
employs. A variety of QKD protocols exists in the liter-
ature, such as the BB84 and the six-state protocol [3, 6].
In these QKD protocols one has full knowledge about the
Hilbert space dimensions, which is crucial for the secu-
rity of these protocols. For instance, the security of the
BB84 protocol critically depends on the four dimensions
of the Hilbert space associated to a qubit pair [27]. The
secret fraction for the BB84 protocol is given by [13]
rBB84∞ = max
{
0, 1− h(Qz)− h(Qx)
}
. (7)
In Eq. (7) the binary entropy is denoted as h(p) :=
−p log2(p) − (1− p) log2(1 − p) and the quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER) in measurement direction i is Qi. The
QBER is defined as the probability that Alice and Bob
generate discordant outcomes, given a fixed set of mea-
surement settings, i.e.,
Qz = P (a 6= b | A = Z,B = Z), (8a)
Qx = P (a 6= b | A = X,B = X) (8b)
4for measuring Pauli Z and X operators.
2. Device-independent QKD
In practice, it is impossible to have full control over the
devices involved in a QKD setup. The idea of DIQKD
is to extract a secret key without making detailed as-
sumptions about the involved devices [11]. The secu-
rity of such DIQKD protocols is based on a loophole-free
Bell-inequality violation [28], for which we have to as-
sume that the two parties are causally separated. In the
spirit of device independence, the measurement devices
are treated as black boxes that perform some (unknown)
measurement conditioned on a classical input chosen by
Alice and/or Bob. The measurement should again yield a
dichotomic classical output. However, in practice some-
times detectors fail and produce no outcome. Measure-
ments where any of the black boxes do not produce an
output have to be incorporated into the measurement
data. Alice and Bob can achieve this by randomly as-
signing a measurement result {±1} to such events [29].
In this sense, every event is a valid DIQKD measurement,
yielding Pclick = 1. Note that these events can be incor-
porated in our description by substituting the final state
that Alice and Bob share in the following way:
ρ → η2dρ+
1− η2d
4
1, (9)
where ηd refers to the probability that a no-detection
event was replaced by a random outcome. Note that ηd
enters the expression in (9) quadratically, because two
detectors of the same efficiency are involved in each mea-
surement. Figure 3 shows the DIQKD setup. The DI
FIG. 3. The DIQKD setup. The measurement devices are
treated as black boxes, i.e., the exact internal operations are
unknown. Additionally, the dimension of the Hilbert space
associated to the state ρ is not specified.
secret key rate can be calculated via
RDI = Rrawr
DI
∞ = Rrepr
DI
∞ , (10)
where we used Pclick = 1 and Rsift = 1 (see above). In
the DD case, the probability Pclick is a function of the
detector efficiency ηd, whereas in the DI scenario ηd en-
ters the secret fraction rDI∞ due to the modification of the
quantum state in (9).
Comparing Eqs. (6) and (10) reveals that both key rates
share the common repeater rate Rrep, which is consistent
with the fact that the purpose of the quantum repeater
is simply to provide entangled states to the two parties.
Alice and Bob can then choose to trust their devices or
not. Several DIQKD protocols have been proposed in the
literature [11, 30, 31]. We employ the protocol in [11].
3. DIQKD protocol
In the DIQKD protocol of [11] Alice randomly (with
biased probabilities) chooses between three measure-
ment settings {A0, A1, A2}. The exact internal measure-
ment process is unknown, but the device generates a di-
chotomic classical output a ∈ {±1} (no-detection events
get an assignment of ±1, uniformly at random). Sim-
ilarly, Bob chooses between two measurement settings
{B0, B1}, producing a binary output b ∈ {±1} in each
round. A random small subset of their (classical) mea-
surement data generated with the setting {A2, B1} is
used to estimate Q := P (a 6= b | A2, B1) and the out-
comes of the settings {A0/1, B0/1} are used to calculate
S := Tr
[
ρ
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
(−1)i·jAi ⊗Bj
]
. (11)
The main result of [11] is a lower bound for the DI secret
fraction of the remaining measurement data of the setting
{A2, B1}, given by
rDI∞ = max
{
0, 1− h(Q)− h
(1 +√S2/4− 1
2
)}
, (12)
under the condition that S > 2 and that the marginal
probabilities of Alice and Bob are symmetric, i.e.,
Tr[ρAi ⊗ 1] = 0 = Tr[ρ1 ⊗ Bj ] for all i, j. This lower
bound was proven for collective attacks and one-way clas-
sical postprocessing in [11]. See also [32] for more gen-
eral quantum adversaries and general communication be-
tween the parties. In the following section we adopt the
specific implementation given in [11], where Q and S are
the QBER and the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH)
parameter [33], respectively.
4. Comparing DDQKD and DIQKD protocols
To point out the distinct features separating both sce-
narios and how they impact the secret key rates, we have
to make the DD and the DI protocol effectively compa-
rable. The specific implementation given in [11] for the
DI protocol uses
A0,1 =
X±Z√
2
, A2 = Z, (13a)
B0 = X, B1 = Z. (13b)
for the measurement operators. To compare this to the
BB84 protocol, where Alice uses {Ax = X,Az = Z}
and Bob {B0, B1} as in Eq. (13b), we also consider the
5asymmetric implementation of the DI protocol, such that
{A2 = Z,B1 = Z} is measured with probability → 1
and with a negligible, but equal fraction with which the
other measurement operators are used. In the DI and DD
case they use these measurement settings to estimate the
CHSH value, Eq. (11), and the QBER Qx, respectively.
Then, in the asymptotic limit, these protocols are equiv-
alent in the sense that almost always the Z-measurement
is used. Alice and Bob only rely on different assumptions
regarding the trust in their measurement devices.
5. Entangled state, QBER and CHSH parameter
The explicit form of the state that is distributed to
Alice and Bob by the quantum repeater is of fundamen-
tal importance for achievable secret key rates. Maximal
correlation, and thus maximal security is provided if the
state ρ is pure and in one of the four Bell states:
|φ1,2〉 := 1√
2
( |00〉 ± |11〉 ), (14a)
|φ3,4〉 := 1√
2
( |01〉 ± |10〉 ). (14b)
For the specific implementation in Eqs. (13), the ideal
state is the pure state |φ1〉 for which the CHSH parame-
ter reaches its maximum value 2
√
2 [34] and the QBERs
vanish. Then, the DD and DI secret fraction are both
equal to 1, which maximizes the corresponding secret
key rates. In practice, the source cannot provide per-
fectly pure states due to noise and other imperfections.
Under the assumption that the initially distributed states
ρ0 are genuine two-qubit states, they can be transformed
into a generic Bell-diagonal state
ρ0 =
4∑
i=1
c
(0)
i,0 |φi〉 〈φi| (15)
by using local operations [35].4 The Bell coefficients c
(0)
i,0
are non-negative and fulfill normalization
∑
i c
(0)
i,0 = 1.
We assume throughout this work that the sources gener-
ate the generic Bell-diagonal state given in Eq. (15). The
ED and ES protocols we use produce Bell-diagonal states,
provided the input states have been of the form (15). The
quantum repeater thus distributes the final state,
ρ =
4∑
i=1
c
(k)
i,n |φi〉 〈φi| , (16)
to Alice and Bob, where c
(k)
i,n denotes the Bell coefficients
after ED in k rounds and ES in n nesting levels. The
4 Note that depolarizing reduces only nonlocal correlations.
coefficients c
(k)
i,n fulfill normalization, and they depend on
c
(0)
i,0 and on the explicit form of the protocol. See [16, 18]
or Appendix B for details of the protocols. The transfor-
mation rules for the coefficients c
(k)
i,n under ED and ES are
summarized in Appendixes C and D for the two quantum
repeater setups. For Bell-diagonal states, as in Eq. (16),
the QBERs Q
(k)
x,n and Q
(k)
z,n are given by
Q(k)x,n = c
(k)
2,n + c
(k)
4,n, (17a)
Q(k)z,n = c
(k)
3,n + c
(k)
4,n. (17b)
To calculate the quantities needed for the DI secret frac-
tion, one needs to substitute the state ρ, Eq. (16), with
its noisy version (9). This results in
Q(k)z,n = η
2
d
(
c
(k)
3,n + c
(k)
4,n
)
+
1− η2d
2
, (18a)
S(k)n = 2
√
2η2d
(
c
(k)
1,n − c(k)4,n
)
, (18b)
where S
(k)
n denotes the violation of the CHSH inequality
with the final state.
III. THE ORIGINAL QUANTUM REPEATER
Now we want to compare achievable secret key rates
for the original quantum repeater (OQR) [15] in the DD
and DI scenario. In Sec. III A we give the missing expres-
sions needed to calculate the repeater rate Rrep. This is
followed by a systematic secret-key-rate analysis, where
we compare the DD and DI QKD performance numeri-
cally (Sec. III B) and analytically (Sec. III C). Since any
two-qubit mixture can be transformed into depolarized
Bell states with local operations [36], we assume that
the sources initially distribute such states with Bell co-
efficients c
(0)
1,0 = F0 and c
(0)
i≥2,0 = (1 − F0)/3, where F0
denotes the fidelity with respect to the Bell state |φ1〉.
A. Parameters and error model
In order to calculate the repeater rate Rrep, we need
to specify the probabilities P0, Pclick, P
(n)
ES , and P
(k)
ED and
how the gate quality pG enters the expression. The prob-
ability that the source successfully connects two adjacent
repeater stations with an entangled photon pair is given
by the transmittivity P0 = ηt(L0), Eq. (1), and the prob-
ability for a valid QKD measurement is Pclick = η
2
d. The
ED and ES protocol employ controlled two-qubit gates
that may introduce noise due to imperfections. We adopt
the depolarizing model of [15] for noisy gates,
O(χ) = pGOideal(χ) + 1− pG
4
1, (19)
where χ denotes an arbitrary two-qubit state on which
the gate O acts. The ED and ES include twofold detec-
tions with PNRDs of efficiency ηd. For perfect detectors
6ηd = 1, the repeater rate is given by Eq. (2). In case of
nonperfect detectors, however, the detection events lead
to a factor η
2(k+n)
d for the success probabilities P
(k)
ED and
P
(n)
ES . Starting from Eq. (5), we thus get
Rprobrep =
1
T0
(
2
3
)k+n
η
2(k+n)
d ηt(L0)
n∏
i=1
1
a
(i−1)
ES
k∏
j=1
P
′ (j)
ED
a
(j−1)
ED
(20)
for the repeater rate with probabilistic ES, where P
′ (j)
ED
now denotes the success probability for ED in round
j without the detector efficiency ηd, which can be cal-
culated via the coefficients c
(j)
i,0 only (see Appendix C,
Eq. (C2)).
B. Performance: DD vs DI secret key rate
With the framework provided in the previous sections,
we now want to systematically analyze achievable secret
key rates in the DD and DI scenario. We split the analy-
sis into two parts, one with perfect detectors ηd = 1 and
one with imperfect detectors ηd < 1, as this quantity de-
termines which repeater rate has to be used for the calcu-
lation. Currently feasible PNRDs reach detector efficien-
cies of ηd ≈ 0.95 at wavelengths around 1550 nm [37].
1. Perfect detectors
For this part we use the deterministic repeater rate in
Eq. (2). Note that for ηd = 1, the differences in the se-
cret key rates solely originate from the DD and DI secret
fraction. We begin the performance analysis with per-
fect gate qualities pG = 1 to understand how ED and ES
influence the secret key rates. Suppose Alice and Bob
are separated by the total distance L = 600 km. At the
end of the repeater protocol, they receive a Bell-diagonal
state with coefficients c
(k)
i,n . Figure 4 shows the secret key
rates R and RDI (upper subfigures), the corresponding
secret fractions r∞ and rDI∞ (middle subfigures), and the
fidelity F (|φ1〉 , ρ) := 〈φ1| ρ |φ1〉 of the final state ρ and
the pure Bell state |φ1〉 (lower subfigures) as a function
of the initial fidelity F0 for various numbers of initial ED
rounds k and nesting levels n. The secret key rates are
calculated via Eqs. (6) and (10). The secret fractions,
Eqs. (7) and (12), are calculated via the QBERs and the
CHSH parameter given in Eqs. (17) and (18).
The first feature that one notices is the fact that R ≥ RDI
holds, which is what we expect, since in the DD case, Al-
ice and Bob can rely on more assumptions, which directly
leads to a higher secret fraction. This should hold in any
fair DD to DI comparison. The secret key rates are only
identical in the ideal case where ηd = 1, pG = 1, and
F0 = 1. Only under these perfect conditions do Alice
and Bob share the pure and maximally entangled state
FIG. 4. Secret key rate R, secret fraction r∞, and final fidelity
F = c
(k)
1,n with respect to |φ1〉 in the DD (dashed lines) and DI
(solid lines) scenario versus the initial fidelity F0 for the gate
quality pG = 1, perfect detector efficiency ηd = 1, and the
total distance L = 600 km. Different numbers of initial ED
rounds are shown, where k = 0 corresponds to the rightmost
curve, and k = 3 to the leftmost one. The left (right) column
represents n = 2 (n = 3) nesting levels, which corresponds to
a fundamental length L0 = 150 km (L0 = 75 km). Note that
for ηd = 1, the curves for the final fidelity F for the DD and
DI scenario coincide.
|φ1〉 〈φ1|, which yields a secret fraction of 1. Comparing
the case of n = 2 nesting levels with n = 3, one observes
that both secret key rates significantly increase with n.
For perfect gates, it is advantageous to reduce the funda-
mental length L0 to decrease photon losses. This holds al-
though more intermediate repeater stations involve more
noisy states connected by ES, which reduces the secret
fractions r∞ and rDI∞ as shown in Fig. 4. For a larger
number of ED rounds k, both QKD protocols become
more resistant to noise in the initial state ρ0 but they
suffer from an overall smaller secret key rate, as several
copies of states are consumed. From the lower subfig-
ures, we observe that ED and ES are two counteracting
processes, when it comes to the final fidelity F with re-
spect to |φ1〉. This is consistent with the shown secret
fractions, since a lower fidelity F results in an increase
of the QBERs and in a decrease of the CHSH parameter
(see Eqs. (17) and (18)).
We now consider imperfect gates. Figure 5 shows the
same quantities as in Fig. 4 but for pG = 0.99. The lower
gate quality has a strong impact on the DI secret frac-
tion rDI∞ and thus also on the DI secret key rate, especially
for more nesting levels n. The mixing of the final state
due to noisy gates has a significantly larger influence on
the CHSH parameter as it has on the QBER Qx. If the
7FIG. 5. Secret key rate R, secret fraction r∞, and final fidelity
F = c
(k)
1,n with respect to |φ1〉 in the DD (dashed lines) and
DI (solid lines) scenario versus the initial fidelity F0 for pG =
0.99, perfect detector efficiency ηd = 1, and the total distance
L = 600 km. Different numbers of initial ED rounds are
shown, where k = 0 corresponds to the rightmost curve, and
k = 3 to the leftmost one. The left (right) column represents
n = 2 (n = 3) nesting levels. Note that for ηd = 1, the curves
for the final fidelity F for the DD and DI scenario coincide.
source distributes states with a high initial fidelity F0, it
is not beneficial for the final fidelity F to perform any
ED. (See crossing points of solid lines in Fig. 5.)
2. Imperfect detectors
For an imperfect detector efficiency ηd < 1, the re-
peater rate is calculated via Eq. (5). The DD secret key
rate additionally suffers from the global scaling factor
Pclick = η
2
d (see Eq. (6)). In the DI scenario, however, the
lack of perfect detectors is equivalent to performing QKD
with states having increased noise, see substitution (9).
These differences aside, the DD and DI secret key rates
can be calculated as before. Fig. 6 compares the secret
key rates as a function of the fidelity F0 for various num-
bers of ED rounds k, different numbers of nesting levels
n, and different gate qualities pG for ηd = 0.975 and
L = 600 km. By comparing the upper two subfigures, we
again observe that the gate quality has a much stronger
impact on the DI secret key rate. Reducing pG = 1 to
pG = 0.99 results in significantly smaller DI secret key
rates, while the DD secret key rates are more or less of
the same order. The difference between the DD and DI
secret key rate becomes higher by increasing the number
of initial ED rounds, which indicates that the number of
FIG. 6. DD (dashed lines) and DI (solid lines) secret key rate
versus the fidelity F0 with imperfect detectors of efficiency
ηd = 0.975 and the total distance L = 600 km. We use
different gate qualities pG and different number of nesting
levels n. The rightmost curve corresponds to k = 0 and the
leftmost curve to k = 3 initial ED rounds.
imperfect quantum operations is a critical quantity for
DIQKD. This is also confirmed by the lower subfigure,
where we increased the number of nesting levels from
n = 2 to n = 3. One gets only a nonvanishing DI secret
key rate for k = 0, whereas the DD secret key rates gain
about 1 order of magnitude. Recall that performing ES
in more nesting levels decreases the fundamental length
L0, thus reducing the probability of photon losses in the
fiber. This explains the higher DD secret key rates for
n = 3. However, in the DI case, the errors introduced by
imperfections outweigh the benefits that one gains from
a reduced fundamental length L0. Hence, in the DI case
one has to accept a larger amount of photon losses in
the fiber of larger fundamental length L0 in comparison
to the DD case. In addition, one has to ensure that the
source distributes entangled states of high initial fidelity
F0. This decreases the number of ED and ES steps and
thus reduces the errors introduced by imperfect devices.
We conclude that in general, the strategy for optimizing
the DI secret key rate is different from the DD case.
In Fig. 7 we vary the detector efficiency ηd and keep the
gate quality pG fixed. It compares DI (solid lines) and
DD (dashed lines) secret key rates for various values of
ηd and confirms the intuition that a reduction of the de-
tector efficiency has a larger impact on the DI secret key
rate. We observe a similar pattern as in Fig. 6. With a
decreasing detector efficiency both secret key rates drop,
but the DI secret key rate is far more affected by the
imperfections of the detector than its DD analogon.
C. Analytical results - Performance
As the secret fractions are calculated via the coeffi-
cients c
(k)
i,n of the final Bell-diagonal state, it is desirable to
8FIG. 7. DD (dashed lines) and DI (solid lines) secret key rate
versus the fidelity F0 for various different detector efficiencies
ηd. The gate quality, the number of nesting levels, and the
total length are set to pG = 0.99, n = 2, and L = 600 km,
respectively. The rightmost curve corresponds to k = 0 and
the leftmost curve to k = 3 initial ED rounds.
analytically characterize the behavior of the coefficients
c
(k)
i,n under ED and ES operations with imperfect devices.
Formulating general analytical results is cumbersome due
to the recursive nature of the transformation rules for
the Bell coefficients under ED and ES, see Eqs. (C1)
and (C3). In an idealized scenario, where the source dis-
tributes pure states, however, we can find closed trans-
formation rules for the coefficients c
(k)
i,n , depending on the
number of nesting levels n and the gate quality pG. We
thus consider the case c
(0)
1,0 = F0 = 1 and c
(0)
i≥2,0 = 0, and
since ED is obsolete for maximally entangled states we
set k = 0. One can show via Eqs. (C3) that the coeffi-
cients transform according to
c
(0)
1,n =
1 + 3pn¯G
4
and c
(0)
i≥2,n =
1− pn¯G
4
∀ n ∈ N, (21)
where n¯ := 2n − 1 denotes the number of intermediate
repeater stations. With Eq. (21) one can express the
QBERs and the CHSH parameter in terms of n¯ and pG.
For the DD QBERs, Eqs. (17), one immediately finds
Q(0)x,n = Q
(0)
z,n =
1− pn¯G
2
(22)
and for the DI quantities via Eqs. (18) similarly,
Q(0)z,n =
1− η2dpn¯G
2
, (23a)
S(0)n = 2
√
2η2dp
n¯
G. (23b)
Recall that the DI secret fraction is only nonvanishing
if the CHSH inequality is violated. Thus, we obtain the
condition
S(0)n > 2 ⇔ η2dpn¯G >
1√
2
, (24)
which the parameters pG, ηd, and n¯ have to fulfill. The
DD and DI secret fractions then become
rDD∞ = η
2
d
[
1− 2h
(1− pn¯G
2
)]
, (25a)
rDI∞ = 1− h
(1− η2dpn¯G
2
)
− h
(1
2
+
1
2
√
2η4dp
2n¯
G − 1
)
,
(25b)
where for rDD∞ , we included the factor η
2
d compared to
Eq. (7). Now, we can investigate the impact of the ex-
perimental quantities ηd, pG, and n onto the secret frac-
tions in terms of partial derivatives, which are given in
Eqs. (C4) and (C6) in Appendix C 2. We quantify the
influence of the parameter onto the secret fractions via
these partial derivatives and thus ask the question which
of the two secret fractions, DD or DI, alters its value
faster when the corresponding parameter is changed.
1. Impact of the detector efficiency ηd
Using the fact that ∂ηdr
DI
∞ is a monotonic function and
respecting the condition given in Eq. (24), one can show
that the inequality ∂ηdr
DI
∞ > ∂ηdr
DD
∞ holds, see Eq. (C8)
in Appendix C 2 for details. Hence, the DI secret frac-
tion reacts more sensitively to changes in the detector
efficiency than the effective DD secret fraction does.
2. Impact of the gate quality pG
For the derivatives of the secret fractions with respect
to the gate quality pG and the nesting levels n, the
ordering of the corresponding expressions in Eqs. (C4)
and (C6) in Appendix C 2 is not as obvious as for the
detector efficiency ηd. Thus, for the sake of simplicity,
we settle for a numerical comparison. Figure 8 shows
the relative change of the derivatives ∂pGr∞ in the DD
(Eq. (C4b)) and DI (Eq. (C6b)) case with respect to
the corresponding secret fraction r∞ for ηd = 1 and
ηd = 0.975 as a function of the gate quality. We ob-
serve that the relative change of the DI secret fraction is
larger than its DD analogon. For ηd < 1 and almost per-
fect gates 1 − pG ≪ 1, though, the opposite is true (see
inset in Fig. 8). This follows from the fact that ∂pGr
DI
∞
no longer diverges for pG → 1 and ηd < 1, in contrary to
∂pGr
DD
∞ ; see Eqs. (C4b) and (C6b).
However, an important difference is that the relative
change in the DI case also depends on the detector ef-
ficiency ηd, in contrast to the DD case. Figure 8 also
verifies the intuition that the impact of the gate quality
pG rises with an increasing number of nesting levels, i.e.,
with an increasing number of imperfect quantum opera-
tions.
9FIG. 8. Relative change ∂pGr∞/r∞ versus the gate quality
pG in the DD (dashed lines) and DI (solid lines) scenario for
detector efficiencies ηd = 1 and ηd = 0.975 (see Eqs. (C4b)
and (C6b)). Different numbers of nesting level n are shown,
where n = 1 corresponds to the leftmost curves and n = 3 to
the rightmost ones.
3. Impact of the nesting levels n
To quantify the influence of n, let us extrapolate the
integer n to a continuous variable. In Fig. 9 we numer-
FIG. 9. Relative change ∂nr∞/r∞ versus the number n in the
DD (dashed lines) and DI (solid lines) scenario for detector
efficiencies ηd = 1 and ηd = 0.975 (see Eqs. (C4c) and (C6c)).
The rightmost curves correspond to the gate quality pG =
0.99 and the leftmost ones to pG = 0.95.
ically compare the relative change of ∂nr∞, Eqs. (C4c)
and (C6c), with respect to corresponding secret fractions
r∞. It confirms that the relative change ∂nr∞/r∞ in the
DI case is larger than its DD analogon, as expected. Note
that ∂nr∞/r∞ is negative and that the DD ratio is again
independent of the detector efficiency ηd. One can also
observe that the impact of n dramatically increases with
a decreasing gate quality pG, which is consistent with
previous results.
To close this section we conjecture that our analytical
results approximately hold for sufficiently pure initial
states, since ǫ small contributions to other Bell states
|φi6=1〉 in the initially distributed states do not signifi-
cantly alter the state at the end of the ES protocol.
IV. THE HYBRID QUANTUM REPEATER
Let us now consider the hybrid quantum repeater
(HQR) introduced by van Loock et al. [17] and Ladd
et al. [38]. It still employs the nested scheme for ES
as shown in Fig. 1, but the repeater stations and the
physical system representing the qubits are of fundamen-
tal difference compared to the OQR. As in [16], we also
restrict our investigation to HQRs where unambiguous
state discrimination (USD) measurements are involved
for state generation [39, 40]. In Part IVA of this section,
we introduce the concepts of HQRs, and in Part III B the
comparison of the DD-DI performance follows.
A. Setup, error model and repeater rate
In Sec. IVA1 we review the model for intermediate
repeater stations and briefly capture the main ideas be-
hind the entanglement creation in this setup. Afterwards,
we present in Sec. IVA2 the error model for noisy two-
qubit gates and explain how to calculate the repeater
rate. See [16] for more details.
1. Repeater station - Model
The HQR combines discrete and continuous degrees of
freedom. Entanglement is for instance generated between
two trapped ions inside a cavity, which represent the
qubits. The entangling interaction, however, is induced
via coherent optical states. The interaction between the
qubits and the light can thus be described within the
Jaynes-Cummings framework [41]. A schematic model
for intermediate repeater stations is shown in Fig. 10.
By performing a USD measurement on the optical modes,
after they interacted with the qubits, the entangled state
ρ0 = F0 |φ1〉 〈φ1|+ (1 − F0) |φ2〉 〈φ2| (26)
can be conditionally prepared. For the HQR, the proba-
bility P0 to connect two adjacent repeater stations with
an entangled state is given by [16]
P0 = 1− (2F0 − 1)
ηtηd
1+ηt(1−2ηd) . (27)
Note that the probability P0 vanishes for pure states ρ0 =
|φ1〉 〈φ1| with F0 = 1, in which case it is not possible to
generate a secret key. For more details regarding the
implementation and state preparation see [16, 40].
2. Error model and repeater rate
ES and ED rely on controlled-Z operations. The model
for a noisy two-qubit gate needs to be adjusted for the
HQR implementation. According to [42], the noisy two-
qubit gate O acting upon the two-qubit state χ ≡ χab,
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FIG. 10. Illustration of repeater stations in the HQR setup
and the USD scheme following [40]. A coherent state |α〉,
the local oscillator (LO), is generated and sent through linear
optical elements, such as beam splitters and optical switches.
Different optical modes are denoted with a and bi, for i ∈
{1, . . . , 5}. The LO passes a beam splitter and a part of
it interacts with qubit Q1, which is prepared in an equally
weighted superposition of its two possible states |0〉 and |1〉.
The resulting optical state is sent together with the LO to the
next repeater station, where again a part of the LO interacts
with qubit Q2, also prepared in an equally weighted super-
position of |0〉 and |1〉. A 50 : 50 beam splitter is applied to
modes b1 and b2 and a displacement operation D to the pulse
in mode b4. Depending on the measurement results of detec-
tors d1 and d2, an entangled state between qubits Q1 and Q2
is generated.
which describes the main errors due to dissipation, is
modeled by
O(χ) = Oideal
(
p2c(pG)χ+ (1− pc(pG))2ZaZbρZaZb
+ pc(pG)(1− pc(pG))(ZaχZa + ZbχZb)
)
.
(28)
Here,
pc(pG) :=
1 + exp
(
− pi(1−p2G)2√pG(1+pG)
)
2
(29)
represents the probability for each qubit to not suffer a Z
error. The quantity pG in Eq. (29) is the local transmis-
sion parameter that describes the effect of photon losses
onto the gate and can thus be seen as an effective gate
quality. Following [16], we calculate the repeater rate ac-
cording to Eq. (2) with deterministic ES, i.e., PES = 1.
We use perfect qubit measurements for the ES and also
ED operations, since the imperfections can in principle
be eliminated from the protocol at the cost of additional
photon losses in the quantum channel, which effectively
reduces the gate quality [39]. Note, however, that we
account for detector imperfections at the initial entan-
glement distribution (as ηd enters the probability P0 in
Eq. (27)) and detector imperfections at the final qubit
measurements in the laboratories of Alice and Bob. The
latter one implies again a factor Pclick = η
2
d for the DD se-
cret key rate, while in the DI scenario the substitution (9)
has to be performed. The DD and DI secret fractions are
calculated according to Eqs. (7) and (12), and since the
final state is again Bell diagonal, the QBERs and the
CHSH parameter are given by Eqs. (17) and (18).
B. Performance: DD vs DI secret key rate
We now want to investigate the influence of the effec-
tive gate quality pG, the detector efficiency ηd, and the
number of ED and ES operations on the secret key rates.
Figure 11 shows the DD and DI secret key rates versus
FIG. 11. DD (dashed lines) and DI (solid lines) secret key
rate for the HQR versus the fidelity F0. The total distance is
L = 300 km, with n = 2 nesting levels. Different numbers of
initial ED rounds k are shown, where the most narrow curves
correspond to k = 0 and the most wide ones to k = 3. The
upper two subfigures show the impact of the effective gate
quality, as it is reduced from pG = 1 to pG = 0.99 with a
fixed detector efficiency of ηd = 0.975. The lower subfigures
similarly display the influence of the detector efficiency, where
we reduce it from ηd = 1 to ηd = 0.95 with the fixed parameter
pG = 0.995.
the fidelity F0 for several numbers of initial ED rounds k.
The total distance is L = 300 km with a fixed number of
nesting levels n = 2. We can observe from the upper two
subfigures that gate imperfections have a large impact on
the DD secret key rate, as already pointed out in [16]. In
the DI case, this becomes even more dramatic. The lower
two subfigures show that detector errors do not signifi-
cantly reduce the DD secret key rate. The DI secret key
rate, however, is heavily compromised by these imperfec-
tions, as they lead to a mixed state due to the random
assignment of measurement results.
We conclude the key rate analysis with Fig. 12, where the
secret key rates are shown as a function of the initial fi-
delity F0 for several numbers of nesting levels n at a fixed
total distance of L = 300 km. We consider gate and de-
tector errors by pG = 0.995 and ηd = 0.975, respectively.
As we can see, it is beneficial for the DD secret key rate
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FIG. 12. DD (dashed lines) and DI (solid lines) secret key rate
versus the fidelity F0. The total distance, the gate quality,
and the detector efficiency are L = 300 km, pG = 0.995, and
ηd = 0.975, respectively. As in Fig. 11, the most narrow
curves correspond to k = 0 and the most wide ones to k = 3
ED rounds. The figure shows the impact of different nesting
levels n, varied from n = 1 to n = 3.
to increase the number of nesting levels beyond n = 2
to reduce photon losses in the fiber. By doing so, the
DD secret key rates gain approximately 1 order of mag-
nitude. In the DI case, however, the errors introduced by
the larger number of imperfect quantum operations out-
weigh again the benefits that one gains from a reduced
fundamental length L0. For a given fidelity F0 the opti-
mal number k of ED rounds is in general different from
the DD scenario as well.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
In this work, we provided a detailed systematic analy-
sis on achievable secret key rates of two quantum repeater
setups in the device-independent (DI) scenario and com-
pared it to the device-dependent (DD) case. We studied
the original quantum repeater (OQR) [15] and the hybrid
quantum repeater (HQR) [17]. The analysis includes a
numerical investigation on how experimental quantities,
such as the gate quality pG, the detector efficiency ηd, the
initial fidelity F0, and the number of nesting levels n and
initial entanglement distillation rounds k, influence the
secret key rate. We observed for both setups that the DI
security comes at the expense of being particularly sensi-
tive towards malfunctions in the devices. Imperfections
of the gates, the detectors, and the sources compromise
the achievable DI secret key rate more than the DD one.
Hence, for any realistic implementation, there is a gap
between these secret key rates that increases with an in-
creasing number of imperfect quantum operations. For
the OQR with an idealized photon source, we addition-
ally verified analytically that the parameters pG, ηd, and
n have a stronger impact on the DI secret key rate, as
they have in the DD scenario.
The proneness of DIQKD to imperfections naturally im-
plies different optimization strategies for the DI and DD
secret key rate. In the DD scenario the influence of the
gate errors is not as severe as it is in the DI case, thus
allowing a shorter fundamental distance L0 and thus re-
ducing photon losses in the fiber, i.e., in the DI case there
are not as many intermediate repeater stations feasible
as in the DD one. This immediately yields a stronger
limitation for the total distance L that one can overcome
in the DI setup. Similarly, the purity of the initially dis-
tributed states can be improved via more entanglement
distillation rounds in the DD protocol, which makes it
more robust to imperfections of the source.
It remains for future investigations to compare different
DD and DI protocols, besides the BB84 and the mod-
ified Ekert protocol [3, 11]. Other ideas are to extend
this analysis to different quantum repeater models, such
as the DLCZ quantum repeater [43]. One could also in-
clude more error sources of the quantum repeater, e.g.
errors introduced by quantum memories, and investigate
their impact on the secret key rates. For the latter one,
we conjecture from the provided secret-key-rate analy-
sis that further imperfections have a qualitatively similar
impact on the DI secret key rate as the ones discussed in
this work.
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Appendix A: Repeater rate: Probabilistic ES
Here, we provide more details for the repeater rate with
probabilistic ES in Eq. (5). In [24], the repeater rate
Rprobrep =
1
T0
(
2
3
)n
P ′0
n∏
i=1
P
(i)
ES (A1)
without initial ED is derived for P ′0 ≪ 1, where P ′0 de-
notes the success probability to connect two adjacent re-
peater stations in nesting level n = 0 with an entan-
gled pair (see also Fig. 1). We review the derivation of
Eq. (A1) and explain how to improve this rate. After-
wards we include initial ED, inspired by [16].
a. Repeater rate without ED
Following [24], the number of attempts n0 to success-
fully create an elementary link is governed by the prob-
ability distribution
p(n0) = (1− P ′0)n0−1P ′0, (A2)
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which yields the expectation value
〈n0〉 =
∑
n∈N0
n0p(n0) =
1
P ′0
. (A3)
In order to perform ES, one needs entangled states in
two neighboring segments of the repeater line. The cor-
responding combined probability distribution is given by
p˜(n0) = p(n0)
2 + 2p(n0)
n0−1∑
k=1
p(k), (A4)
which results in the average number of attempts
〈n˜0〉 =
∑
n0∈N0
n0p˜(n0) =
3− 2P ′0
(2 − P ′0)P ′0
. (A5)
The first ES step can now be performed, which succeeds
with probability P
(1)
ES , thus increasing the average number
of attempts to create an entangled link in nesting level
n = 1 according to
〈n1〉 = 〈n˜0〉
∑
k∈N0
(k + 1)(1− P (1)ES )kP (1)ES =
〈n˜0〉
P
(1)
ES
. (A6)
From now on, our approach deviates from the one in [24],
where 〈n˜0〉 in Eq. (A5) is set to 3/2P ′0, which is a good
approximation for P ′0 ≪ 1. Here, we rewrite Eq. (A5) as
〈n˜0〉 = 3− 2P
′
0
(2− P ′0)P ′0
=
1
P ′0
3
2
a
(0)
ES , (A7)
where we defined
a
(0)
ES
:=
1− 2P ′0/3
1− P ′0/2
. (A8)
In complete analogy to Eq. (A3), the probability P1 to
create an entangled link in nesting level n = 1 is given by
the inverse of Eq. (A6), and we can define an according
probability distribution p(n1) via P1. This is in gen-
eral not true, as the success probability of establishing a
link in a higher nesting level n = i in the nith attempt
depends on success probabilities of the previous nesting
levels [24] and the corresponding probability distribution
p(ni) is not analog to the form given in Eq. (A2). How-
ever, this modification allows us to obtain the recursion
〈ni〉 = 1
Pi
=
〈n˜i−1〉
P
(i)
ES
∀ i ∈ N, (A9)
〈n˜i〉 = 3− 2Pi
(2− Pi)Pi =
1
Pi
3
2
a
(i)
ES ∀ i ∈ N, (A10)
if we iterate this argument to arbitrary nesting levels.
The constants a
(i)
ES are defined as in Eq. (A8) with the
corresponding probability Pi. The beginning of the re-
cursion is given in Eqs. (A3) and (A7). Note that this ap-
proach also only yields a good approximation for P ′0 ≪ 1,
but this strategy leads to repeater rates which are closer
to achievable ones that are calculated with Monte Carlo
simulations.
With the relations (A9) and (A10) we can express the av-
erage number of attempts to establish a single entangled
link at the maximum nesting level n = N as
〈nN 〉 = 〈n˜N−1〉
P
(N)
ES
=
3
2
a
(N−1)
ES
P
(N)
ES
1
PN−1
= . . .
=
(
3
2
)N
1
P ′0
N∏
i=1
a
(i−1)
ES
P
(i)
ES
. (A11)
Each attempt lasts the fundamental time T0, thus yield-
ing the repeater rate
Rprobrep =
1
T0
(
2
3
)N
P ′0
N∏
i=1
P
(i)
ES
a
(i−1)
ES
. (A12)
b. Repeater rate with ED
In the spirit of [16], we now include initial ED, which
is performed at each segment at nesting level n = 0 and
which thus only affects the success probability P ′0. Thus,
P ′0 is given by the recursively defined probabilities P
′
0 =
P
(k)
L0
for successful ED in k rounds in Eq. (3). By plugging
the recursive probabilities into each other, one arrives at
P
(k)
L0
=
2
3
P
(k)
ED
a
(k−1)
ED
P
(k−1)
L0
= · · · =
(
2
3
)k
P0
k∏
j=1
P
(j)
ED
a
(j−1)
ED
,
(A13)
where we defined the constants a
(j)
ED for ED as in
Eq. (A8). Replacing P ′0 in Eq. (A12) with the right-hand
side of Eq. (A13) yields the repeater rate in Eq. (5).
Appendix B: ED and ES protocol
For completeness, we review the ED and ES proto-
cols [16, 18], which determine together with the noisy
two-qubit gate models in Eqs. (19) and (28) the transfor-
mation of the coefficients c
(k)
i,n (see Appendixes C and D).
Let Cs→tNOT denote a controlled-X operation, where s and
t indicate the source and the target qubit, respectively.
a. Entanglement distillation
Suppose Alice and Bob share the two states ρai,bi for
i ∈ {1, 2}. The following steps are performed. (i) Al-
ice/Bob rotates her/his particles by +/− pi2 around the X
axis in the computational basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. (ii) Alice/Bob
applies Ca1→a2NOT /C
b1→b2
NOT . (iii) The state ρa2,b2 is measured
in the computational basis. Then, if their measurement
results coincide, the state ρa1,b1 has been purified. Oth-
erwise the state is discarded.
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b. Entanglement swapping
Suppose the two entangled states ρa,b and ρc,d are dis-
tributed among two adjacent repeater stations. The fol-
lowing algorithm performs ES between these two states.
(i) A Cb→cNOT-gate is applied. (ii) Qubits b and c are mea-
sured in the basis {|±〉 := (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2} and {|0〉 , |1〉},
respectively. (iii) Depending on the measurement out-
comes, a single-qubit rotation on qubit d is performed
and one obtains the entangled state ρa,d.
Appendix C: Additional material: OQR
1. Transformation under ED and ES
With the discussed error models and the ED and ES
protocols, we recall the transformation rules of the co-
efficients c
(k)
i,n . For the OQR, gate errors are modeled
according to Eq. (19). See [16, 18] for details.
a. Entanglement distillation. Two copies of the
Bell-diagonal state ρ(k−1) =
∑4
i=1 c
(k−1)
i |φi〉 〈φi| repre-
sent the input states for the ED protocol. Provided
the ED protocol is successful, one is left with one Bell-
diagonal state with the coefficients
c
(k)
1 =
1
8P
′ (k)
ED
[
1 + p2G
(
8c
(k−1) 2
1 + 8c
(k−1) 2
4 − 1
)]
, (C1a)
c
(k)
2 =
1
8P
′ (k)
ED
[
1− p2G
(
1− 16c(k−1)1 c(k−1)4
)]
, (C1b)
c
(k)
3 =
1
8P
′ (k)
ED
[
1 + p2G
(
8c
(k−1) 2
2 + 8c
(k−1) 2
3 − 1
)]
, (C1c)
c
(k)
4 =
1
8P
′ (k)
ED
[
1− p2G
(
1− 16c(k−1)2 c(k−1)3
)]
, (C1d)
where the success probability of ED round k is
P
′ (k)
ED =
1
2
(
1 + p2G
(
2c
(k−1)
1 + 2c
(k−1)
4 − 1
)2)
. (C2)
b. Entanglement swapping. Two qubit pairs, each in
the Bell-diagonal state ρn−1 =
∑4
i=1 ci,n−1 |φi〉 〈φi|, are
the input states to the ES protocol that includes a proba-
bilistic Bell measurement on two qubits, one of each pair.
The two qubits not involved in the Bell measurement are
again in a Bell-diagonal state with coefficients ci,n. The
transformation rules are
c1,n =
1− pG
4
+ pG
4∑
i=1
c2i,n−1, (C3a)
c2,n =
1− pG
4
+ 2pG
(
c1,n−1c2,n−1 + c3,n−1c4,n−1
)
,
(C3b)
c3,n =
1− pG
4
+ 2pG
(
c1,n−1c3,n−1 + c2,n−1c4,n−1
)
,
(C3c)
c4,n =
1− pG
4
+ 2pG
(
c1,n−1c4,n−1 + c2,n−1c3,n−1
)
,
(C3d)
and the success probability for ES is given by P
(n)
ES = η
2
d,
neglecting dark counts of the detector.
2. Analytical calculations
a. Partial derivatives of secret fractions
The partial derivatives of rDD∞ , Eq. (25a), with respect
to ηd, pG, and n are given by:
∂ηdr
DD
∞ = 2ηd
[
1− 2h
(1− pn¯G
2
)]
, (C4a)
∂pGr
DD
∞ = 2
n¯η2dp
n¯−1
G
ln(2)
artanh
(
pn¯G
)
, (C4b)
∂nr
DD
∞ = 2(n¯+ 1)η
2
dp
n¯
G ln(pG)artanh
(
pn¯G
)
, (C4c)
where we introduced the area hyperbolic tangent
artanh(x) :=
1
2
ln
(
1 + x
1− x
)
∀ x ∈ (−1, 1), (C5)
which is the inverse tangent hyperbolic function. The
partial derivatives of rDI∞ , Eq. (25b), with respect to ηd,
pG, and n are
∂ηdr
DI
∞ =
2ηdp
n¯
G
ln(2)
q(ηd, pG, n¯), (C6a)
∂pGr
DI
∞ =
n¯η2dp
n¯−1
G
ln(2)
q(ηd, pG, n¯), (C6b)
∂nr
DI
∞ = (n¯+ 1)η
2
dp
n¯
G ln(pG)q(ηd, pG, n¯), (C6c)
where the function q(ηd, pG, n¯) is defined as:
q(ηd, pG, n¯) :=
2η2dp
n¯
G√
2η4dp
2n¯
G − 1
artanh
(√
2η4dp
2n¯
G − 1
)
+ artanh
(
η2dp
n¯
G
)
. (C7)
b. Comparison: Impact of detector efficiency
For the partial derivatives of rDD∞ and r
DI
∞ with respect
to the detector efficiency, Eqs. (C4a) and (C6a), one can
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derive an ordering relation to show that ηd has a larger
impact in the DI scenario. Note that ∂ηdr
DI
∞ is positive for
all parameters ηd, pG, and n¯ that fulfill the condition (24)
and that ηd∂ηdr
DI
∞ is a strictly monotonically increasing
function of η2dp
n¯
G. Hence, the following ordering holds:
∂ηdr
DI
∞ ≥ ηd∂ηdrDI∞ ≥ lim
η2
d
pn¯
G
→√2−1
(
ηd∂ηdr
DI
∞
)
=
√
2
ln(2)
(
artanh
(
1/
√
2
)
+
√
2
)
> 2, (C8)
where we used artanh(1/
√
2) > 0 and 0 ≤ ηd, ln(2) ≤ 1.
Finally, note that in the DD case, ηd enters the effective
secret fraction η2dr
BB84
∞ as a factor with r
BB84
∞ given in
Eq. (7). This partially derived with respect to ηd yields
2ηdr
BB84
∞ , which is upper bounded by 2. This proves the
inequality ∂ηdr
DI
∞ > ∂ηdr
DD
∞ as claimed in Sec. III C.
Appendix D: Additional material: HQR
1. Transformation under ED and ES
Here, we give the transformation relations for the Bell
coefficients under ED and ES for the HQR, where gate
errors enter the calculation via Eq. (28). See [16].
a. Entanglement distillation. We calculate the coef-
ficients after ED round k with respect to the coefficients
after ED round k− 1, which we do not label here explic-
itly for a better overview. Also, we suppress the depen-
dency on pG of pc(pG) and introduce the abbreviation
p¯ := 2pc(pc − 1):
c
(k)
1 =
1
P
(k)
ED
[
p¯2
(
c1 − c4
)(
c1 − c4 + c2 − c3
)
+ p¯
(
c21 + c
2
4 + (c1 − c4)2 − c1c3 − c2c4
)
+ c21 + c
2
4
]
, (D1a)
c
(k)
2 =
1
P
(k)
ED
[
p¯2
(
c1c3 + (c2 − c3 − c4)c4
)− p¯(c3 + c4)c4 + 2(p¯+ 1)2c1c4 − p¯(p¯+ 1)c1(c1 + c2)], (D1b)
c
(k)
3 =
1
P
(k)
ED
[
p¯2
(
c1c2 + c3c4
)
+ (p¯+ 1)2
(
c22 + c
2
3
)− p¯(p¯+ 1)(c2(c3 + c4) + (c1 + c2)c3)], (D1c)
c
(k)
4 =
1
P
(k)
ED
[
p¯2
(
c2c4 + (c1 − c3 − c4)c3
)− p¯c3(c3 + c4)+ 2(p¯+ 1)2c2c3 − p¯(p¯+ 1)(c1 + c2)c2]. (D1d)
The success probability for ED round k is given by
P
′ (k)
ED = (c1 + c4)
2 + (c2 + c3)
2 + p¯(2c1 + 2c4 − 1)2.
(D2)
b. Entanglement swapping. Similar to Eqs. (D1), we
neglect the index for the previous nesting level n − 1.
The Bell coefficients transform under the ES protocol
according to
c1,n = 2
(
c1c4 + c2c3
)
+ 2pc
(
c1(1− c1 − 3c4)− c2(c3 − c4)− (c2 − c4)c3
)
+ p2c
(
2c1 + 2c4 − 1
)2
(D3a)
c2,n = 2
(
c1c3 + c2c4
)
+ pc
(
(2c1 + 2c4 − 1)2 + 2(c1 − c4)(c2 − c3)
)− p2c(2c1 + 2c4 − 1)2, (D3b)
c3,n = 2
(
c1c2 + c3c4
)
+ pc
(
(2c1 + 2c4 − 1)2 − 2(c1 − c4)(c2 − c3)
)− p2c(2c1 + 2c4 − 1)2, (D3c)
c4,n =
4∑
i=1
c2i − 2pc
( 4∑
i=1
c2i − (c1 + c4)(c2 + c3)
)
+ p2c
(
2c1 + 2c4 − 1
)2
. (D3d)
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